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INVOLUNTARILY MEDICATING CONDEMNED INCOMPETENTS
FOR THE PURPOSE OF RENDERING THEM SANE AND
THEREBY SUBJECT TO ExECuTION
The federal government, the military, and forty-one states currently
use capital punishment.' Beginning during the Great Depression, the
United States has witnessed a persistent trend away from capital punish-
ment. This evolution culminated in 1972 when the Supreme Court held
in Furman v. Georgia 2 that under existing law the death penalty consti-
tuted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments.' Since the reinstatement of capital punishment in
the late 1970s,4 however, the trend has reversed. Over 160 convicted
criminals have been executed since the 1970s, and 2600 more currently
sit on "death row" awaiting execution.'
The controversy accompanying capital punishment has shifted from
ethics to expediency. In recent decisions, the Supreme Court has cur-
tailed the appeal process for those receiving capital sentences by narrow-
ing the grounds for appeal,6 limiting the appellant group,7 and expanding
1. In 1986, Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, West Vir-
ginia, and Wisconsin did not have death penalty statutes. Barbara A. Ward, Competency for Execu-
tion: Problems In Law and Psychiatry, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 35, 107 (1986).
2. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
3. Id. at 239. The Court considered the imposition of the death penalty on three defendants;
one was convicted of murder and two were convicted of rape. The Court held that the imposition of
the death penalty in each case would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
4. See Ward, supra note 1, at 37 (noting that after Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972),
state legislatures refined their capital sentencing statutes). See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976) (upholding revised state capital punishment laws of Florida, Georgia, and Texas).
5. DEATH Row, U.S.A. 1 (NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, New York, N.Y.),
Spring 1992, at 279. Of the 168 executions, 157 have been carried out since 1983. Id. at 282.
6. See, eg., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (holding that a new, more lenient rule gov-
erning evidence required for prima facie case of racial discrimination in use of preemptory challenges
did not apply retroactively).
7. See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) (holding that second death row in-
mate lacked standing to challenge validity of first death row inmate's death sentence when first death
row inmate waived his right to appeal).
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the condemnable class to include minors8 and mentally retarded
persons.9
The Supreme Court has recognized as a general rule that an incompe-
tent cannot commit a crime,10 stand trial," plead guilty, 2 be sentenced,
and be punished. 13 However, the Court has also demonstrated a willing-
ness to strengthen the capital punishment tool by allowing a case-by-case
determination of competency, notwithstanding previous common law
protection of certain individuals or classes. "
8. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). The Court followed the two-part Eighth
Amendment analysis outlined in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), decided the same day. See
infra note 9. First the Court found that because the common law embraced the execution of those
under 17, the punishment was not cruel and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, and
therefore it was constitutional. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 368. Second, the Court examined several
objective factors and determined that the executions of minors were not contrary to the "evolving
standards of decency that mark a maturing society." Id. at 369 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1858)).
9. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). The common law prohibited the execution of
"idiots." While this could indicate that capital punishment was cruel and unusual, here the defend-
ant was adjudged competent to stand trial; subsequently the jury rejected his insanity defense. Id. at
331-33. The Court further found no objective evidence of an emerging national consensus against
the execution of the mentally retarded. Id. at 334-35.
10. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 332 (1989) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 4.02(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962)). "A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the
time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of law." Id.
11. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam). The test to determine com-
petency to stand trial is whether the defendant "has sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Id. at 402.
12. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) ("It was error, plain on the face of the
record, for the trial judge to accept petitioner's guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was
intelligent and voluntary."). See also Saddler v. United States, 531 F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 1976);
Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211, 214-15 (9th Cir. 1973); Schoeller v. Dunbar, 423 F.2d 1183 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 834 (1970).
13. See Saddler, 531 F.2d at 86 (explaining that defendant's right of allocution would be mean-
ingless if he were incompetent at sentencing). See also 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1988) (providing for hear-
ing on the present mental condition of convicted defendant prior to sentencing); Gord v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). See Ward, supra note 1, at 49.
14. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (no blanket prohibition on executing mi-
nors); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (no blanket prohibition on executing a mentally re-
tarded individual). Reshaping the condemnable class is easier than redefining the substantive legal
and ethical foundations of capital punishment.
The scope of this Note is limited to the appropriateness of involuntarily medicating incompetents
for the purpose of rendering them competent and thereby subject to execution. For a detailed dis-
cussion of the procedural implications of Ford v. Wainwright upon competency determinations, see
Robert F. Schopp, Note, Wake Up and Die Right. The Rationale, Standard, and Jurisprudential
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Capital punishment has always generated fervent debate.15 The proce-
dure and evaluation of capital offense cases has fluctuated persistently
but never at the level of activity seen recently.16 Moreover, medication of
an individual absent or contrary to his consent has evoked passionate
pleas and similar elements of consideration.17 The identification, treat-
ment, and handling of incompetents is continuously changing." The
Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of the involuntary medication
of condemned incompetents.19 This Note argues that the Court will have
difficulty overcoming the inherent practical, ethical, and legal problems
of state determination of a condemned's competence through involuntary
medication. Therefore, involuntarily medicating condemned incompe-
Significance of the Competency to Face Execution Requirement, 51 LA. L. REv. 995 (1991); Paul F.
Enzinna & Jana L. Gill, Capital Punishment and the Incompetent: Procedures for Determining Com-
petency to be Executed after Ford v. Wainwright, 41 FLA. L. REv. 115 (1989).
15. See Joseph M. Giarratano, "To The Best of Our Knowledge, We Have Never Been Wrong'"
Fallibility vs. Finality in Capital Punishment, 100 YALE L.J. 1005 (1991) (arguing that the ines-
capable risk of executing even one innocent individual should be enough to abolish capital punish-
ment entirely).
16. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (requiring procedural safeguards to
determine competency of inmate), aff'd, 891 F.2d 807 (1 lth Cir. 1989), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 222
(1990). But see Martin v. Dugger, 686 F. Supp. 1523, 1557 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (calling Ford a prece-
dential quagmire because no real holding on required procedures), aff'd, 891 F.2d 807 (11th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 222 (1990).
17. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (Due Process Clause permits the state
to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if
the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate's best interest).
18. MARVIN E. LICKEY & BARBARA GORDON, MEDICINE AND MENTAL ILLNESS (1991).
Drugs used in the treatment of schizophrenics and other incompetents include clozapine, chlorprom-
azine, haloperidol, fluphenazine, and thiothivene. Id. at 380. See also Claudia Wallis & James
Willwerth, Pills for the Mind, TIME, July 6, 1991, at 52-60.
19. The significance of the issue of involuntarily medicating condemned incompetents is a prod-
uct of the Court's changing view of capital punishment. Ford v. Wainwright represents the most
recent significant decision in this area. In Ford, the Court declared that the insane may not be
executed, but failed to define who is insane. The result was a legal quagmire. See supra note 16.
The declaration restricting capital punishment in certain instances is a pyrrhic promise to protect the
incompetent. Because the Court left the definition of incompetency open, it subjects the protected
class to erosion beyond that found at common law. An illustration of this possibility appeared in
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). The Court noted in Stanford that the executions of a 16
and 17 year old "did not violate evolving standards of decency" and therefore survived the cruel and
unusual punishment standards of the Eighth Amendment. Id.
In 1990, the Supreme Court vacated a Louisiana trial court order to forcibly administer antip-
sychotic drugs to a condemned prisoner. Perry v. Louisiana, 111 S. Ct. 449 (1990). The trial court
reinstated its order on remand. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed on the forcible medication
issue, but affirmed the trial court's holding that the prisoner was not competent to be executed. The
court held that the state's use of involuntary medication in order to execute was unconstitutional.
State v. Perry, 1992 WL 296230, at *3 (Oct. 19, 1992).
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tents in order to render them sane and thereby subject to execution is
neither plausible nor constitutionally permissible.
Part I defines incompetence by examining the different methodologies
and the disparate goals of the legal and psychiatric professions. Part II
examines the traditional rule that incompetents are exempt from execu-
tion, tracing the evolution of that policy from its inception at common
law and its development under the Eighth Amendment, to current treat-
ment of the mentally incompetent. Part III discusses the general legal
issues concerning involuntary medication and informed consent. Part IV
examines the limitations of the psychiatric profession and their influence
over the involuntary medication of incompetents. Part V discusses the
role of cognitive and affective understanding in the punishment process
and its relationship to involuntary medication. Part VI concludes that
too many problems exist to permit a policy which would authorize a
state to involuntarily medicate death row inmates for the purpose of ren-
dering them competent to stand execution.
I. COMPETENCY
The law presumes that a criminal defendant is competent unless it ap-
pears to the defense counsel, next friend,20 prosecution, or court that he
is in fact mentally impaired.2 If evidence of significant mental incapac-
ity is presented,22 the court must address the issue of competency; failure
20. Use of a "next friend" to litigate occurs often in habeas corpus litigation, because of the
inmate's inability to act on his own behalf due to his detention. To litigate as a "next friend" of a
condemned prisoner, one must: (1) provide an adequate explanation-such as inaccessibility, mental
incompetence, or other disability-why the inmate cannot appear on his own behalf to prosecute the
action; (2) be truly dedicated to the inmate's best interests;, and (3) demonstrate some significant
relationship with the inmate. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163-64 (1990).
21. 3A LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA OF PERSONAL INJURIES AND ALLIED SPECIALTIES:
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW § 17.38, at 72 (Charles J. Frankel ed., 3d ed. 1983) [hereinafter PsY-
CHIATRY AND THE LAW]. A "mental disorder" is "conceptualized as a clinically significant behav-
ioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in a person and that is associated with present
distress (a painful symptom) or disability impairment in one or more important areas of functioning
or with a significantly increased risk of suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss of
freedom." AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL (3d
ed. rev. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III-R].
22. Jurisdictions differ on the issue of who may initiate proceedings to determine the compe-
tency of a condemned inmate. Some provide by statute that only designated officials, such as those
exercising control over and custody of the prisoner, have the power to petition for a competency
hearing. See, eg., Shank v. Todhunter, 75 S.W.2d 382, 383 (Ark. 1934) (superintendent of state
penitentiary may initiate competency hearing); People v. Riley, 235 P.2d 381, 383 (Cal. 1951) (en
banc) (warden must notify a local attorney regarding petitions for competency hearings); Common-
wealth v. Barnes, 124 A. 636, 637 (Pa. 1924) (superintendent, jail physician, warden, or other chief
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss4/7
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to answer the competency question may be grounds for subsequent rever-
sal of a conviction.2 a Notwithstanding public and judicial concerns of
undue delay,2 it is unlikely and even unusual25 that feigned mental ill-
ness 6 would present an obstacle to implementing execution decrees.27
executive officer of the institution or other responsible person may apply for commitment to mental
hospital).
In jurisdictions with no statute, a particular individual need not raise the competency issue.
Rather, the defense counsel, next friend, or the court may initiate the process. See, eg., State v.
Nordstrom, 58 P. 248 (Wash. 1899) (inmate and his counsel initiated process for competency deter-
mination), aff'd 181 U.S. 616 (1901); Grossi v. Long, 238 P. 983 (Wash. 1925) (competency hearing
initiated by "next friend"); Baughn v. State, 28 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1896) (court has discretion to dismiss
petition of inmate or "next friend" for competency hearing), aff'd sub nom Nobles v. Georgia, 168
U.S. 398 (1897).
23. PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW, supra note 21, § 17.38, at 72. The Supreme Court has held
that deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of a prisoner violates the Eighth Amend-
ment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Subsequent circuit court decisions concluded that
mental illness may be categorized as a serious medical need. See, e.g., Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d
1052, 1058 (11th Cir. 1986); Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
468 U.S. 1217 (1984); Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977).
24. A criminal judgment necessarily includes the sentence imposed upon the defendant. See
Flynt v. Ohio, 451 U.S. 619, 620 (1981). Collateral challenges to a capital sentence delay its enforce-
ment and decrease the possibility of finality that accompanies the end of litigating a matter. Cf
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[A]ttention will ultimately
be focused not on whether a conviction was free from error but rather on whether the prisoner can
be restored to a useful place in the community.") Cf U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS BULLETIN, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1990 10 (1988) (during the period of 1977-1990, the
average time from sentencing to execution was six years and 10 months). But see Demosthenes v.
Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 738 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES, COM-
MITTEE REPORT AND PROPOSAL 6 (1989)) (acknowledging in the Conference's proposal for stream-
lined review in capital cases that a prisoner is entitled, at a minimum, to one complete and fair
course of collateral review in the state and federal system free from the temporal pressure of an
impending execution).
25. A defense attorney may be reluctant to request evaluation and perhaps treatment of his
mentally ill client by a psychiatrist. Most criminal defendants do not wish to be recognized or
categorized as mentally ill. Hence, usually the prosecutor will file the request for evaluation follow-
ing an informal agreement with the defense attorney, enabling the defense attorney to retain the trust
of the defendant. PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW, supra note 21, § 17.38, at 72.
26. Malingering and a factitious disorder are not the same. A factitious disorder is "character-
ized by physical or psychological symptoms that are produced by the individual and are under vol-
untary control." DSM-III-R, supra note 21, at 360. However, though the symptoms are faked, the
motivation for the conduct is unknown. Thus, "behavior under voluntary control is used to pursue
goals that are voluntarily adapted." Id. On the other hand, a malingerer exhibits symptoms that are
faked with a clearly recognizable goal in mind. For example, malingering includes feigning an illness
to avoid incarceration or indoctrination into the armed forces. Id. See also PSYCHIATRY AND THE
LAW, supra note 21, § 17.18.
27. A capable prison mental health team of consulting psychiatrist should be available and
trained to distinguish malingering from a true mental illness. PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW, supra
note 21, § 17.38, at 76.
Washington University Open Scholarship
1234 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 70:1229
In Ford v. Wainwright,28 although the Supreme Court recognized that
the Eighth Amendment prohibits a state from executing a prisoner who
is insane, the majority did not attempt to formulate a comprehensive defi-
nition of insanity or incompetence.2 9 Medical competency is a functional
concept measured by one's ability to participate in relationships and pro-
ductive activity."0 Legal competency, however, is specific to each case.3
A. Legal Competency
The legal test for determining incompetency in the execution context is
not the M'Naghten right and wrong rule, 2 which is applied most fre-
quently in determining responsibility for a criminal act.3 3 Nor is the test
used to determine competency to stand trial the appropriate measure of
the individual's capacity. That test requires only a reasonable degree of
rational understanding34 and fluctuates with the complexity of the crime
and trial proceedings.35 Rather, the proper test of competency at the
time of punishment weighs a number of factors.
A condemned individual must have sufficient mental capacity to un-
derstand the nature of the proceedings against him, for what he was
tried, the purpose of the punishment, and his impending fate. Further-
more, he must exhibit sufficient understanding to recognize and compre-
28. 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986).
29. Ford, 477 U.S. 399, 418 (1986). In his concurrence, Justice Powell provided his definition
of insanity. "[Tihe Eighth Amendment forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the
punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it."). Id. at 421-22.
30. See infra part I.B.
31. See LACKEY & GORDON, supra note 18, at 373-76.
32. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). The M'Naghten rule states that every person is
presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes until
proved otherwise. To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, a defendant must prove that at
the time of the act, he was laboring under such defect of reason as not to know the nature and
quality of his act, or, if he did know it, that he did not know that he was doing wrong. Id. at 722.
The "right and wrong" label given to the M'Naghten test stems from the latter portion of the rule,
which examines whether, at the time of the act, the accused knew the difference between right and
wrong.
The M'Naghten test is often criticized for failing to address the situation in which the accused
understood his action but was incapable of controlling it. See People v. Drew, 583 P.2d 1318, 1322-
23 & n.7 (Cal. 1978) (citing Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 66-67 (9th Cir. 1970)).
33. Commonwealth v. Moon, 117 A.2d 96, 99 (Pa. 1955).
34. See supra note 11.
35. The mental capacity required to stand trial correlates to the complexity and variability of
the crime and trial itself. Thus, as the complexity of the trial increases, the mental ability required to
participate in that trial by, for example, assisting with cross-examination or following testimony also
increases. PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW, supra note 21, § 17.38, at 74.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss4/7
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hend any existing fact which might render his punishment unjust or
unlawful, and he must show the intelligence necessary to convey such
information to his attorney or the court.36  The legal determination
whether an individual is competent for execution is a complex, fact-in-
tensive question.37 Factors evaluated in determining competency include
psychiatric evaluations, previous mental diagnoses, and contradictory
affidavits.38
B. Medical Competency
The medical or clinical test of competency has more structure but is
arguably even more uncertain than its undefined 39 legal counterpart.
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ("DSM-III-
R")4' has standardized the diagnostic nomenclature of American psychi-
atry.4 DSM-III-R lists precise criteria for each mental disorder, many
of which are derived from verifiable facts in the patient's history or con-
temporaneous behavior conduct.42 DSM-III-R thus eliminates much di-
agnostic ambiguity.
However, DSM-III-R has not standardized the basic theoretical
frameworks used in competency determinations.43 Four theories have
traditionally dominated the field of mental competency:' psychoanaly-
sis,45 behaviorism,46 interpersonal psychiatry,47 and biologic psychia-
36. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-5.6(b) (1989).
37. See Hamilton v. Texas, 110 S. Ct. 3262, 3263 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of
application for stay of execution).
38. See Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 736-37 (1990).
39. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 418 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part) (the full
Court did not attempt a comprehensive definition of insanity or incompetence). See also supra note
29 and accompanying text.
40. DSM-I11-R, supra note 21.
41. PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW, supra note 21, § 17.10, at 11.
42. Id.
43. Id. The document is extensive but not universally popular. The drafts were a product of
compromise between various viewpoints rather than a consensus of the psychiatric profession. Id.
44. Id. § 17.3, at 3-4.
45. Psychoanalysis explains psychologic functioning as a series of developmental stages. An
individual either successfully masters and transcends these stages or suffers psychological arrest and
is impeded from mature personality development. Psychoanalysis stems from the work of Sigmund
Freud and posits the existence of the unconscious mind and the superego (id) and ego. A psychoan-
alyst treats the patient by examining his thoughts, emotions, and behavior. He does not use medica-
tion in treating the patient. Id. § 17.4, at 4.
46. Behaviorism studies objective signs (behaviors) and is only slightly concerned with unob-
servable motivation, the crux of psychoanalysis. Id. § 17.5.
47. Interpersonal psychiatry examines and interprets an individual's behavior according to his
Washington University Open Scholarship
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try.48  The differences between these theories are greatest in their
disparate methods of investigation and approaches to treatment.49 Thus,
psychiatrists agree only on the diagnostic procedure, not the interpreta-
tion, origin, or treatment of the problem. 0 Moreover, even if the psychi-
atrists' perspectives were the same, the consideration of competency
alone is insufficient."1 As in law,52 the clinical determination of compe-
tency must be associated with a specific task or behavior.5 3 The more
difficult or complex the situation, the higher the level of mental capacity
necessary to be deemed competent.54
II. INCOMPETENT INDIVIDUALS ARE EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION
The justification for establishing and maintaining capital punishment
primarily derives from the valid penological purposes of retribution and
deterrence.55 Generally, if a sentence makes no measurable contribution
to acceptable goals of punishment or is grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the crime, it is unconstitutional.56 In Coker v. Georgia," the
Supreme Court noted that when evaluating a person to determine
whether punishment is disproportionate or excessive, a court must con-
sider historical developments, legislative judgments, international opin-
environmental and interpersonal context. Practitioners generally train in one of the other three
fields and subsequently turn their application of that method of analysis from the individual to the
individual's relationships. Id. § 17.6.
48. Biologic psychiatry studies mental process and illness from an organic viewpoint, seeking
anatomic and electrochemical explanations for normal and abnormal functioning. Consequently
biologic psychiatrists are the most prolific users of medication in treatment. The practitioner's eval-
uation includes physical, neurological, and mental status examinations in addition to the compilation
of a pervasive patient history. Id. § 17.7.
49. Id. § 17.25, at 50-51. Psychiatric practitioners use a general theory consisting of the theo-
ries of two schools: the dynamic approach and the descriptive-organic approach. The dynamic
approach relies on psychoanalytic and psychologic theory to explain mental phenomena, The de-
scriptive-organic approach views mental symptoms as resulting from anatomic or physiologic distur-
bance. Modem psychiatry and the legal system favor the descriptive-organic approach because it
uses more objective evidence to support its conclusions. Id.
50. See id. § 17.10.
51. See id. § 17.33, at 58.
52. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
53. PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW, supra note 21, § 17.33, at 58.
54. Id.
55. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
56. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).
57. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
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ion, and jury sentencing decisions.5" Thus, an examination of the
historical antipathy at English common law regarding the execution of
incompetents is warranted in order to fully understand its development
and current standing in this country.
The common law prohibited the punishment of "idiots" and "lunat-
ics." 9 Though the common law test for insanity for a condemned pris-
oner is open to some dispute,' the prohibition against execution
generally applied to persons totally lacking in reason and understand-
ing.6 Many different rationales support this proposition,62 but the pri-
mary basis is threefold: practical, religious, and humane.63
As a practical matter, execution of an incompetent has questionable
retributive and deterrent value. Executing an insane person has no value
of general deterrence, as distinguished from specific deterrence or inca-
pacitation .6 Nor can the execution of an incompetent serve as an exam-
ple to others.65 A prohibition against the execution of incompetents will
58. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982) (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592
(1977) (plurality opinion)).
59. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 24-25 (1809)). "[Ildiots and lunatics are not chargeable
for their own acts, if committed when under these incapacities .... [A] total idiocy, or absolute
insanity, excuses from the guilt, and of course from the punishment, of any criminal action commit-
ted under such deprivation of the senses." Id.
60. One test is whether the defendant was aware of the fact that he had been convicted and was
about to face execution. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & David W. Louisell, Death, the State, and the
Insane: Stay of Execution, 9 UCLA L. REV. 381, 394 (1962). Others argue, however, that the
standard could only have been the kind of insanity recognized when the rule was originally devel-
oped, a standard requiring a kind of "obvious frenzy or imbecility." See J.D. Feltham, The Common
Law and the Execution of Insane Criminals, 4 MELB. U. L. REV. 434, 467 (1964).
61. Feltham, supra note 60, at 467.
62. See Ward, supra note 1, at 49-57. As many as six justifications exist for the common law
competency rule: (1) a competent prisoner might have been able to make allegations which would
stay judgment or execution; (2) the madness or incompetency is punishment itself; (3) an incompe-
tent person is unfit to make peace with God; (4) an insane person's execution has no general deter-
rent value; (5) the execution of an insane person is inhumane; and (6) there is no retributive value in
executing an insane person. Id.
63. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406-10 (1986).
64. Ward, supra note 1, at 51. Of course, the execution of an insane person would accomplish
specific deterrence. Id.
65. Id. (citing EDWARD COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE 6 (1680)). But see Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339
U.S. 9, 17-18 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("[I]f he fell mad after judgment, he shall not be
executed: tho I do not think the reason given for the law in that point will maintain it, which is, that
the End of Punishment is the striking a Terror into others, but the execution of a Madman had not
that effect, which is not true, for the Terror to the living is equal, whether the Person be mad or in
his senses.") (quoting John Hawles, Remarks on the Tryal of Charles Bateman, in 3 STATE TRYALS
651, 652-53 (1719)).
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not affect a sane person. He will be executed regardless of the incompe-
tents' punishment and therefore perceives no additional deterrent value if
they are executed." Alternatively, an incompetent prisoner by definition
is incapable of understanding the activity relating to him, and therefore
cannot receive any deterrent value from the execution of a fellow
incompetent.67
The retribution theory68 does not support the execution of incompe-
tents. The theory is predicated upon an assumption that a punitive act of
equal quality must avenge every wrong act.69 Society's interest in impos-
ing the death penalty, therefore, must not be less than the prisoner's suf-
fering-the anticipation of imminent death.7° Yet, an individual's
mental illness prevents him from suffering this requisite anticipation.7t
Thus, executing an incompetent exacts a punishment less valuable than
the crime itself and fails the retribution test.72 In addition, society has
traditionally perceived the execution of incompetents as offensive to hu-
manity. 73 Finally, the prohibition against the execution of incompetents
was predicated on the ground that the individual was unfit to make peace
66. Critics of this school of thought warn of a flood that insane death row inmates will occur.
These criticisms are unfounded. Notwithstanding the criticism of psychiatric evaluation discussed
infra part IIIA, psychiatry is sufficiently capable of distinguishing between actual and feigned
mental illness. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
67. See generally Hazard & Louisell, supra note 60, at 386 n.17.
68. Retribution is "the application of the pains of punishment to an offender who is morally
guilty." H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND REsPONSIBILITY 9 (1968). See also Hazard & Louisell,
supra note 60, at 386-87 (retribution is the theory "that each wrong must be offset by a punitive act
of the same quality.").
69. Ward, supra note 1, at 54.
70. If retribution is an expression of society's moral outrage, society's goal is necessarily frus-
trated when the force of the state is brought to bear against one who cannot comprehend its signifi-
cance. Absent this requisite comprehension, retribution must fail by definition. Id. at 55 (citing
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion); Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial,
81 HARV. L. REv. 454, 459 (1967)).
71. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409 (1986).
72. See Ward, supra note 1, at 55; Hazard & Louisell, supra note 60, at 386-87. See also supra
note 68.
73. See Ward, supra note 1, at 52-54. Coke explained, for example, that the execution of the
prisoner is not offensive; but, when a madman is executed, society is outraged. Rather, the latter is
"a miserable spectacle against the law and of extreme inhumanity and cruelty." Id. at 52 (citing
EDWARD COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE 6 (1680)). However, some argue that this rationale applies to
the death penalty generally. See Ward, supra note 1, at 52 (citing Henry Weihofen, A Question of
Justice: Trial or Execution of an Insane Defendant, 37 A.B.A. J. 641, 652 (1951)). Weihofen noted
that the quintessential issue in executing the incompetent is "whether it is less humane to execute a
guilty criminal while he is insane than it is to postpone the execution until we make sure he under-
stands what we mean to do to him-and then kill him." Id.
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with God.74 For all of these reasons, common law exempted incompe-
tents from execution.
The Eighth Amendment75 similarly prohibits barbaric punishments
and sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed.76 Both
principles were deeply rooted in common law jurisprudence,77 expressed
in the Magna Carta,7" and applied by the English courts for centuries.79
When the framers adopted the language of the English Bill of Rights in
drafting the Eighth Amendment,8" they adopted these basic English prin-
ciples.8 The Supreme Court has recognized explicitly the principle of
74. "[I]t is inconsistent with religion, as being against Christian Charity to send a great Of-
fender quick, as it is stil'd into another World, when he is not of a capacity to fit himself for it."
Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 18 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting John Hawles, Re-
marks on the Tryal of Charles Bateman, in 3 STATE TRYALS 651, 652-53 (1719)). See also Ward,
supra note 1, at 50-51.
75. The Eighth Amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
76. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (holding the imposition of a life sentence for
uttering a "no account" check for $100 was disproportionate and therefore in violation of the Eighth
Amendment); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256 (1972) (imposing the death penalty, under
discretionary statutes, on defendants convicted of murder and rape was inequitable and constituted
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment). See also Solem, 463 U.S. at
284 ("The final clause [of the Eighth Amendment] prohibits not only barbaric punishments, but also
sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed.").
77. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 284. The principle of proportionality, as set forth in the Magna
Carta, was repeated and extended in the First Statute of Westminster. See id. at 284-85. When
incarceration became the normal criminal sanction, as opposed to amercements, see infra note 78,
the common law recognized that it too must be proportional. Id. at 285 (citing Hodges v. Humkin,
80 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016 (K.B. 1615) (Croke, J.) ("[I]mprisonment ought always to be according to
the quality of the offence.")).
78. Three chapters of the Magna Carta were devoted to the rule that amercements could not be
excessive. An amercement, similar to a modern-day fine, represented the most common criminal
sanction in thirteenth century England. Solem, 463 U.S. at 284 & n.8. Chapter 20 of the Magna
Carta stated that "[a] freeman shall not be amerced for a small fault, but after the manner of the
fault; and for a great crime according to the heinousness of it." Id. at 284 n.9.
79. The royal courts relied upon the principles of proportionality and barbaric punishments to
invalidate disproportionate punishments. Solem, 463 U.S. at 285 (citing Le Gras v. Bailiff of Bishop
of Winchester, Y.B. Mich. 10 Edw. 2 pl. 4 (1316), reprinted in 52 Selden Society 3 (1934)). For
example, the House of Lords declared a £30,000 fine imposed by the court of King's Bench to be
"excessive and exorbitant, against magna charter, the common right of the subject, and against the
law of the land." Id. (citing Earl of Devon's Case, 11 State Trials 133, 136 (1689)).
80. The Eighth Amendment was based directly upon Article I, § 9 of the Virginia Declaration
of Rights, which itself had adopted verbatim the language of the English Bill of Rights. Solem, 463
U.S. at 285 n.10. The English Bill of Rights stated that "excessive Baile ought not to be required nor
excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments inflicted." Id. at 385 (citing 1 W. &
M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1688)).
81. One of the consistent themes of the revolutionary era was that Americans possessed all the
rights of English subjects. Solem, 463 U.S. at 286. The United States' Bill of Rights was designed in
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proportionality for almost a century 2 and has applied it in several cases
to invalidate criminal sentences.8 3 Similarly, the Supreme Court has held
that the Eighth Amendment precludes the execution of incompetents. 84
In Ford v. Wainwright, 5 the Court explained that the common law
reasons proscribing the execution of an incompetent have equal logical,
moral, and practical force today.86 Moreover, it is well established that
the Eighth Amendment's proscriptions are not limited to those practices
condemned by the common law. 7 Instbad, the Court's Eighth Amend-
ment analysis of cruel and unusual punishment applies a two-prong test
which can extend, but not restrict, interests which it protects. First, the
Eighth Amendment prohibits punishment considered cruel and unusual
at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights. 8 Second, punishment
contrary to the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society violates the Eighth Amendment. 9 Two recent
Supreme Court decisions have narrowed the protection of the Eighth
Amendment.
In Penry v. Lynaugh,9 the Court held that the Eighth Amendment
does not categorically prohibit the execution of mentally retarded indi-
viduals.91 The Court concluded that the proscription against executing
part to preserve those rights, notwithstanding the revolution. The use of the language of the English
Bill of Rights established that the framers intended to provide at least the same protection afforded
by its English counterpart. Id.
82. In 1910, the Supreme Court held that "it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime
should be graduated and proportioned to offense." Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367
(1910) (holding that a 15-year sentence of "cadena temporal," imprisonment which included hard
labor and permanent civil disabilities, for the falsification of public documents violated the Eighth
Amendment). See also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding that a 90-day sentence
imposed for status of being addicted to narcotics violated the Eighth Amendment).
83. In its proportionality analysis, the Court uses several objective criteria, including: (1) the
gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals
in the same jurisdiction, Le., whether more serious crimes are subject to similar or less serious penal-
ties than the crime at issue; and (3) the sentences imposed for the commission of the same or similar
crimes in other jurisdictions. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92 (1983).
84. See Ford v Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
85. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
86. Ford, 477 U.S. at 409.
87. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286 (1983) "Although the Framers may have intended
the Eighth Amendment to go beyond the scope of its English counterpart, their use of the language
of the English Bill of Rights is convincing proof that they intended to provide at least the same
protection." Id. See also Ford, 477 U.S. at 405-06.
88. Ford, 477 U.S. at 405-06.
89. Id. at 406 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
90. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
91. Penry, 492 U.S. at 330-35. The court rejected the petitioner's assertion that imposing the
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incompetents precluded executing profoundly or severely retarded indi-
viduals.92 In contrast, Penry was only mildly to moderately retarded and
had been certified competent to stand trial.9
3
In Stanford v. Kentucky,94 decided the same day as Penry, the Court
held that the death penalty was not cruel and unusual punishment for
individuals of sixteen and seventeen years of age.95 The Court found no
common law proscription against the execution of sixteen and seventeen
year olds.96 Moreover, the Court found no evidence that such an execu-
tion was contrary to the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.
97
III. INVOLUNTARY MEDICATION AND INFORMED CONSENT
It is well established that a doctor may not treat a patient unless the
patient consents.98 The issue of consent with respect to incompetence
raises several problems. First, a valid contract for treatment is formed
between physician and patient upon the patient's informed consent.99
This requires that the patient both seek the doctor's advice and possess
the capacity to form a contract.'O° An incompetent satisfies neither re-
quirement. 10 1 Because he lacks the legal capacity to incur even voidable
contractual duties, 102 an incompetent cannot form or be bound by con-
death penalty on a mentally retarded individual constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Penry
was mildly moderately retarded. Id. at 307-08. The jury found him competent to stand trial. More-
over, the jury rejected Penry's insanity defense and found him guilty of capital murder. Id. at 308,
310. Ultimately, Penry was sentenced to death. Id. at 311.
92. Penry, 492 U.S. at 333. There are five levels of mental retardation, four of which are mea-
sured by IQ level: (1) mild, 50-70; (2) moderate, 40-50; (3) severe, 25-40; (4) profound, below 25; (5)
unspecified. DSM-III-R, supra note 21, at 32-33.
93. Penry, 492 U.S. at 333. See supra note 91.
94. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
95. Stanford involved two cases of capital sentences for minors both convicted of murder. Id.
at 365-66. In both cases, the defendants were tried as adults. Id. at 365, 367.
96. Id. at 368. Neither petitioner claimed that the common law considered executions of 16
and 17 year olds cruel and unusual.
97. Id. at 369-80. The court examined legislative enactments, the rarity of capital sentences
below age 18, and public opinion polls. Id.
98. See, e.g., Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 13 (Minn. 1905).
99. LICKEY & GORDON, supra note 18, at 371.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12(2)(c) (1979). "A natural person who
manifests assent to a transaction has full legal capacity to incur contractual duties thereby unless he
is ... mentally ill or defective."
1241
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tract.103 In addition, because competency is a functional concept mea-
sured by one's ability to participate in relationships and productive
activity"0 4 and an incompetent is unable to understand the nature and
consequences of his conduct, he will not seek out a psychiatrist's advice
or assistance. 105 Clearly, the incompetent cannot consent to medication.
Second, in a state-ordered examination to determine competency for
trial, the incompetent must be informed that he has the right to remain
silent."°6 Imposition of that same standard for execution competency ex-
aminations might serve to erect an impenetrable wall. 10 7 Absent at least
minimal interaction with the proposed patient, a psychiatrist will have
difficulty formulating an accurate or valuable assessment of the individ-
ual's mental status. 108 The incompetent's silence would shield him from
evaluation and execution, regardless of subsequent medical treatment.
Finally, the successful but involuntary medication of an incompetent
may itself yield additional problems. Specifically, a now-competent de-
fendant may subsequently refuse further medication. The prisoner may
refuse to consent to continued medication and thereby voluntarily pro-
duce incompetency in an effort to circumvent or frustrate the legal
process. 109
103. "No one can be bound by contract who has not legal capacity to incur at least voidable
contractual duties." Id. § 12(1).
104. See supra part I.B.
105. LICKEY & GORDON, supra note 18, at 371.
106. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1982). In Smith, a psychiatrist who had examined the
defendant in the pretrial competency determination phase subsequently testified against the defend-
ant in the capital sentencing stage. Id. at 457, 459-60. The Supreme Court found that the psychia-
trist was an agent of the state, which entitled the defendant to full protection under the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments. Id. at 467, 471. The Court held that a defendant must be informed both of his
right to remain silent and that his statements could be used for sentencing purposes. Id. at 468.
107. See Ward, supra note 1, at 78 ("Because a psychiatrist examining an inmate for compe-
tency to be executed, like the psychiatrist in [Estelle v. Smith], does not have a neutral status, a
fortiori, the same protections prescribed in Smith should be afforded in an execution competency
examination.").
108. A mental status examination is an essential part of any psychiatric evaluation. The exami-
nation includes an evaluation of the following functions of the patient: (1) general appearance; (2)
motor activity and behavior; (3) speech and communication; (4) mood; (5) organization and content
of thought; (6) perception; (7) level of awareness, orientation, and concentration; (8) memory, recall,
and fund of knowledge; (9) abstract thinking and judgment; and (10) an understanding of his own
condition, i.e., insight. D.G. Langsley, The Mental Status Examination, in PSYCHIATRY IN GEN-
ERAL MEDICAL PRACTICE (G. Usdin et al. eds., 1979). At least four of these criteria require verbal
interaction between the patient and practitioner. PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW, supra note 21,
§ 17.8, at 8.
109. Courts addressing this issue have concluded that "a criminal defendant may not voluntarily
confound the legal process to his own advantage." Id. § 17.38, at 75.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss4/7
1992] MEDICATION OF INCOMPETENTS FOR EXECUTION 1243
The right to refuse treatment, however, is not absolute. In the tradi-
tional involuntary medication test, 110 the Supreme Court has held that a
court must weigh the interests of the state against the individual's liberty
interest.1 I I Before the state can forcefully medicate an individual, it must
demonstrate a threat to its interests in public safety and security.
1 12
Moreover, unless the court determines that without medication the pa-
tient presents an immediate threat of violence that cannot be avoided
through use of less restrictive alternatives 13 and that the treatment is in
the inmate's medical interest, 14 no justification exists for the forced med-
ication. 15 Frequently, the state must prove an immediate threat to the
patient's self or others beyond a reasonable doubt.1 6 However, the in-
ability of psychiatrists to accurately predict future behavior dictates that
only those who are already dangerous may satisfy this criterion permit-
ting involuntary medication. I" Balancing the interests of the individual
and the state creates difficulty when analyzing the constitutionality of the
involuntary medication of condemned incompetents.
In this context, the individual's interest is paramount. There can be no
greater interest retained by an individual than that which bears directly
upon his life." 8 A state's interest is more varied and detailed, but none-
theless undeniably great.' 19 The state has a substantial and legitimate
110. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). In Washington, the Court held that the state
could involuntarily medicate an inmate if it was reasonably related to legitimate penological interest.
Id. at 227.
111. "Respondent possesses a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administra-
tion of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at
221-22 (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-94 (1980); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316
(1982); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600-01 (1979)).
112. In Washington, the Court held that the state's interests in prison safety and security were
well established. Washington, 484 U.S. at 223 (citing Turner v. Saftey, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); O'Lane
v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987)).
113. See Washington, 494 U.S. at 225. "'Tlhe absence of leading alternatives is evidence of the
reasonableness of a prison regulation,' but this does not mean that prison officials have to set up and
then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant's constitu-
tional complaint.'" Id. (quoting Turner v. Saftey, 482 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1987)).
114. Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1815 (1992).
115. Frequently, the Court applies a narrow definition of "dangerous" when determining
whether an individual is imminently likely to become so violent that he will inflict bodily harm upon
himself or others. LICKEY & GORDON, supra note 18, at 370.
116. Id.
117. Id. The standard of proof is extremely stringent, requiring almost 90% certainty of vio-
lence. Absent an existing state or history of violence (e.g., credible violent or suicidal attempts) the
requisite proof is unattainable by psychiatrists and psychologists.
118. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 359 n.141 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
119. Martin v. Dugger, 686 F. Supp. 1523, 1559-60 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (citing Ford v. Wainwright,
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interest in taking the petitioner's life as punishment for his crime. 20 The
Court has determined that the appropriate involuntary medication analy-
sis is a balance of the individual's and state's interests in the context of
the condemned incompetent. 121 The Court has not, however, determined
which interest is greater.
IV. LIMITATIONS OF THE PSYCHIATRIC PROFESSION
A potential obstacle to the involuntary medication of incompetents for
the purpose of execution is in the field of psychiatry itself. The problem
has two aspects. First, the psychiatric fields of diagnosis, treatment, and
evaluation are uncertain and unpredictable. 122 In addition, the psychia-
trists themselves face extremely serious ethical difficulties. Either of
these may prove to undermine, inter alia, a proposed policy medicating
condemned incompetents involuntarily.
A. Uncertainty
As previously discussed, the psychiatric profession has no uniform the-
ories with respect to evaluating incompetents. 123 This uncertainty may
become so acute that the legal system will no longer comfortably rely on
psychiatric evaluations when determining an inmate's competency for
execution. 24 The problem will also occur when the state desires to medi-
cate an individual prior to execution: without a reliable method of deter-
mining competency, how can the legal system proceed to execute
anyone?
477 U.S. 399 (1986), aff'd, 891 F.2d 807 (1lth Cir. 1989), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 222 (1990)). The
state is compelled by society's retributive demand and the effectuation of its own rule making au-
thority. Moreover, the state has afforded the prisoner a full trial and all its attendant rights. It has
provided opportunity in the appellate process to challenge the conviction, to make a collateral chal-
lenge to both the conclusions of liability and the imposition of sentence, and to determine his compe-
tency. Id.
120. Ford, 477 U.S. at 425 (Powell, J., concurring).
121. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). See supra notes 110-17 and accompanying
text.
122. In 1980, the American Psychiatric Association published the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, Third Edition (DSM-III) which marked a significant advancement in
psychiatric diagnosis. A revised version (DSM-III-R) was issued in 1987 and another (DSM-IV)
was due in 1992. LICKEY & GORDON, supra note 18, at 37-39, 47.
123. See supra part I.B.
124. See Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise:
Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693 (1974); Dale A. Alfers et al., Involuntary
Hospitalization and Psychiatric Testimony: The Fallibility of the Doctrine of Immaculate Perception,
6 CAP. U. L. REv. 11 (1976).
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In response to this argument, however, is the fact that today the legal
system does determine competency to stand trial, plead guilty, and be
sentenced.125 Notwithstanding ambiguities in the medical profession, the
law has developed standards of legal competency.
. Ethics
The difficulty of determining competence with a satisfactory level of
assurance is complicated by the ethical role of the mental health profes-
sional. A psychiatrist bases his judgment of a defendant's competency
upon numerous, but not necessarily commonly shared or commonly val-
ued, factors.126 Psychiatrists face the dilemma of reconciling their ethi-
cal obligation to treat the mentally ill with the realization that restoring
an inmate to competency facilitates his execution.127 Unguided psychia-
trists may refuse to cooperate in the medication of an incompetent for his
execution. 28
V. COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE UNDERSTANDING
An incompetent defendant lacks the cognitive or affective understand-
125. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
126. ELLsWORTH A. FERSCH, JR., LAW, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE COURTS; RETHINKING
TREATMENT OF THE YOUNG AND THE DISTURBED (1979). An incompetent's evaluation depends
upon his psychiatrist's notion of the law, vision of the counsel-client relationship, interest in protect-
ing the defendant from the harshness of the criminal justice system, tendency to view mentally ill
people as unable to care for themselves, attitude toward the relation between mental health care and
civil liberties, tolerance for deviant behavior in the community, and interest in judicial economy and
speedy trials. Id. A psychiatrist's views toward the legal system represent the most important factor
of the analysis. If he renders a definitive judgment removing the defendant from the authority of the
judge, he may move the incompetent from the punitive criminal justice system to the therapeutic
mental health system. See id. at 99-100.
127. The ethical dilemma facing a physician or psychiatrist is twofold: "First, should the psy-
chiatrist agree to treat the inmate to make him ready for execution? Second, should he participate in
a recertification process, assuring the state that the inmate is indeed competent for execution?"
Ward, supra note 1, at 90.
128. One model that was developed to analyze the ethical dilemmas facing the psychiatrist in an
execution competency examination identified four distinct positions: (I) the principled approach
opposes any psychiatric participation at all; (2) the consequentialist approach directs psychiatric
participation on the ground that the failure to provide evaluation and treatment for the mentally ill
on the principled approach leaves such evaluations to those favoring the death penalty; (3) the em-
pirical approach allows the psychiatrist to examine and report the prisoner's degree of mental disor-
der, but avoid the ultimate issue of competency for execution; and (4) the psycholegal approach
directs an examination, diagnoses, and opinion regarding competency for execution. Ward, supra
note 1, at 85-87 (citing Michael Radelet & George Barnard, Ethics and the Psychiatric Determina-
tion of Competency to be Executed (Nov. 20, 1984) (unpublished manuscript)).
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ing of his crime, punishment, and death to be executed. Generally, an
affective understanding refers to an emotional understanding, while a
cognitive understanding is an intellectual one.129 It is unclear whether
psychiatric treatment sufficiently corrects these deficiencies;130 thus, even
involuntary medication may not be sufficient to support the execution of
an individual.13 1
An illustration of the distinction between cognitive and affective
knowledge appears in United States ex reL Donham v. Resor.132  In
Donham, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York determined that a West Point cadet who had completed three
years at the Military Academy, preparing for war, was not sincere in his
beliefs as a conscientious objector. The cadet claimed that while he had
an intellectual knowledge that he had undertaken his training in anticipa-
tion of war, he did not have an emotional understanding of that fact.
t33
The court noted the frequently large gap between intellectual and emo-
tional understanding and accepted the point as substantial, 34 but never-
theless upheld the finding of the military review board that Donham's
beliefs were not sincere. 135
Similarly, in Neely v. Hollywood Marine, Inc. 136 and Ray v. Defelice
Marine Contractors, Inc. ,137 Louisiana courts held that a determination
of a personal injury victim's competence to accept a settlement offer from
the defendant, required consideration of the injured party's emotional
129. See DSM-1 1 I-R, supra note 21, at 391 (defining "affect" as "a pattern of observable behav-
ior that is the expression of a subjectively experienced feeling state (emotion)"); United State ex rel.
Donham v. Resor, 318 F. Supp. 126, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 436 F.2d 751 (2d
Cir. 1971).
130. Psychiatrists often confuse their own hopes (for clear diagnostic evaluations and for being
able to cure incompetents) with facts. This demonstrates that much treatment does not work, espe-
cially when forced, and that diagnoses are very confused at best. FERSCH, supra note 126, at 99-100.
"Despite discouraging research on the results of their work, psychologists and psychiatrists continue
to say that they can do much more than it has been proved they can do and to take on whatever is
asked of them." Id. at 100.
131. Even medicated, the individual may still be legally incompetent.
132. 318 F. Supp. 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 436 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1971).
133. The cadet claimed that "actual combat duty was four years away, distant enough to make it
seem much less important than the day-to-day struggle of New Cadet Barracks." Donham, 318 F.
Supp. at 127.
134. Id. at 132.
135. Id. at 133. The court found that the cadet's surprise at having to learn to use a bayonet at a
military academy was unrealistic. It further held that his claim that it took him two years to realize
that people actually die in wars was an incredible assertion of naivete. Id.
136. 530 So. 2d 1116 (La. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1080 (1989).
137. 439 So. 2d 1102 (La. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984).
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reaction.' 38 This includes not only an intellectual understanding but also
an emotional understanding.' 9
Underlying principles of the death penalty require that the condemned
possess an affective knowledge of his crime and punishment.' 4° There-
fore, for execution competency purposes, a prisoner must have an affec-
tive knowledge of the facts surrounding his crime and punishment. An
individual who lacks the requisite affective understanding cannot com-
prehend society's moral outrage, and is arguably incompetent for
execution.
VI. CONCLUSION
The courts cannot permit the involuntary medication of incompetents
for the purpose of rendering them sane and thereby subject to execution.
American criminal law has long established that a defendant's moral
guilt is critical to the degree of his culpability."' The execution of an
individual who lacks sufficient cognitive or affective knowledge of his
predicament has no support from either of the primary justifications for
capital punishment-retribution and deterrence. Retribution fails be-
cause society cannot exact a measure of punishment commensurate with
the crime from one who cannot understand his punishment either intel-
lectually or emotionally.'42 Deterrence fails because the only possible
deterred class, incompetents, cannot comprehend what is happening
anyway. 143
Moreover, limitations on the diagnosis and treatment procedures of
the psychiatric profession give rise to serious questions concerning their
efficacy and certainty.'" The ethical problems faced by practitioners im-
plementing any such policy further compounds this problem and in-
creases an already unacceptable level of uncertainty. '4  Error in capital
138. The fact that plaintiffs in both cases were seamen with special status as wards of the court
dictated the inquiry to some extent. Neely, 530 So. 2d at 1123.
139. Ray, 439 So. 2d at 1105.
140. See Ward, supra note 1, at 54-56. One of the principle justifications for the death penalty is
that it permits society to exact retribution upon individuals meriting punishment. See supra notes
68-72 and accompanying text.
141. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697-98 (1975).
142. See supra notes 68-72, 140 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
145. See Enzinna & Gill, supra note 14, at 124 (reducing the risk of erroneous decisions). See
supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
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punishment matters is irrevocable and unforgivable. 146 Therefore, the
fallibility of psychiatry and its practitioners similarly militates against the
forcible medication of condemned incompetents.
Finally, a policy of medicating incompetents for execution is contrary
to established Supreme Court doctrine. The Court has taken extraordi-
nary measures to ensure that the prisoner sentenced to death is afforded
process that will guarantee, as much as humanly possible, that the sen-
tence was not imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake.' 47 In
light of the previously discussed clinical, ethical, and practical difficul-
ties, one cannot ensure the validity of a capital punishment policy which
includes the execution of involuntarily medicated incompetents.
The Supreme Court has stated that incompetents are exempt from exe-
cution.' 4  This statement and its foundation in seven centuries of law
should not be cast aside by medicating individuals for the pain of one and
the benefit of none. Some may argue that the realization of the state's
interest in carrying out a sentence benefits society. However, the true
societal benefit would have been forcible medication prior to the crime
which brought the imposition of this death sentence. Society would
thereby save a life, that of the victim, instead of taking one, that of the
criminal incompetent.
Matthew S. Collins
146. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 620 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("Where life itself
is what hangs in the balance, a fine precision in the process is what must be insisted upon.").
147. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118 (1982) (O' Connor, J., concurring). See also Cali-
fornia v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983).
148. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
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